Chapter XV: Peace Settlement
Part III: March 7th, The Third Day
As usual, we awoke at 0700 for breakfast and last minute planning for the coming conferences. As with the previous day, we agreed amongst ourselves that Hirota Koji would be the principle speaker despite dissension from Tanaka Shizuichi. Yamamoto, who had on the 6th hoped for a larger role, assented to Hirota’s dominance as he realized that he had no experience that could possibly compare to Hirota’s expertise. Yamamoto’s methods, after all, consisted largely of threats of resignation and other such blackmail, none of which would work on a delegation only too apathetic to the possibility of us walking out of the negotiations. Thus, half an hour before 0900 we left our compound and headed toward the conference hall.
At more or less exactly 0900 we all sat down and faced our counterparts across the table as Chen Gongbo stood up and again made a short welcoming speech, again hoping for success as we had all left the room yesterday evening having tasted it—perhaps he was being ironic, I could not decide. Sitting down, he offered the floor to Hirota to broach the topic of the day’s negotiations. Accepting this task, Hirota named Southeast Asia as the topic, specifically Siam and Indochina. The Chinese were not only not surprised by this topic but Chen Gongbo and Wang JingWei immediately began their attack, assailing Hirota Koji with requests that their historical claim to Annam be honored. Hirota Koji professed ignorance, I know not whether it was real or feigned, and Wang JingWei explained that Annam had been for a long time a satellite to the various great Chinese dynasties and that it was only proper for it to be returned to its proper place in this regard.
Hirota acted skeptical and asked what region Annam covered, to which Wang JingWei replied that it comprised all of southeast Asia but that, in his own words, ‘Siam is up for debate.’ Hirota rejected this outright, arguing that, whatever might be said about the Japanese successes—or lack thereof—in Korea, their conquest of Southeast Asia could not be denied. He reminded the Chinese delegation that even Li Zongren had not managed to overcome Japanese resistance at Haiphong and that, once he had finally reached the gateway to Indochina, all he had managed was to stumble into a trap that shut behind him and destroyed nearly a score of divisions. To complete his argument, he also added that, even though much of the area had been recovered by Chinese divisions, against no resistance, it only required a short and quick thrust to close the one road connecting China and Indochina and thus seal the face of the ten or so divisions occupied there. He concluded by definitively stating that, though the previous day the Chinese had negotiated from a position of strength, on this day their stand was born of weakness.
Chastened, the Chinese delegation asked what Hirota proposed, who answered that he was willing to partition Southeast Asia, with the greater share going to Japan. This, he maintained, was one of the unmovable tenets of the day’s negotiations—that Japan’s benefits from the territorial gains would outweigh China’s. To our surprise, the Chinese seemed to accept this calmly; they must have anticipated as much. However, before any partitioning could be accomplished, it was time to eat lunch and, for me, to interview another key Chinese general.
On the first day I had spoken with Li Zongren, on the second day Zhang Xueliang. Today, I wished to speak with the final major Chinese general from 1936: Bai Chongxi. I already knew that he had once been the chief of staff and was still the chief of navy staff, was a naval officer as well as the single most gifted Chinese army general. However, what he told me proved that he was far more interesting than he first seemed. He spoke of the uncertainties of the war against the Nationalists, of the surprise of the first few weeks when their forces were seemingly inexplicably absent, and of the worry and shock of Japan’s declaration of war. He then turned to the strategy against Japan and mentioned that the Chinese naval strategy was his brainchild, a true “fleet-in-being” strategy—as I did not understand the full implications of the turn, he explained that a fleet-in-being is one that is always occupying the enemy in some manner or another to prevent their own fleet from functioning effectively. I admitted to him that his strategy certainly worked; in fact, it worked on an absolutely miraculous level.
The hour with Bai Chongxi passed quickly and soon we were back in the conference hall, with all eyes turned toward the central three figures in the negotiations: Hirota Koji, Chen Gongbo and Wang JingWei. Hirota began by explaining that he would honor the Chinese historical claim to Annam, but that it would not be the incredibly bloated version put forth by Wang JingWei that morning; rather, it would consist of simply a strip of land tied to the coast in a region that was generally known as “Vietnam.” This drew immediate protestation from Wang JingWei , who pleaded strategic necessity of protecting Guilin from another southern invasion and stated that Laos was necessary for the security of the capital. On our advice, Hirota called his bluff and allowed us to explain that Vietnam would provide all the buffer zone China would need as, due to the heavy jungle, it would take a considerable amount of time for any invasion force to reach the actual Chinese border anyway, enough time for China to marshal a response. Wang JingWei seemed fit to argue, but Chen Gongbo motioned him to silence and instead asked Hirota Koji what his plans for the rest of Southeast Asia were.
Hirota, back on track, explained that while China would gain Vietnam as a satellite state, he intended to carve the rest of the territory into two client states for Japan: landlocked Laos and a greater Siam, which would comprise Siam itself and the territory it had frequently attempted to lay claim to before its annexation by China, that would otherwise constitute the state of Cambodia. To our surprise, Chen Gongbo agreed easily to this proposal. In his own memoirs he explains that, being the minister of armaments for China, he had long known that the majority of the vast quantities of rare minerals were to be found in Vietnam, more that in the rest of the Southeast Asian states combined and that Siam was only worthwhile for its iron, which China already had in abundance.
Somewhat stunned, Hirota Koji asked Chen Gongbo whether they should begin discussing certain matters reserved for the next day. Chen Gongbo assented, and Hirota quickly shuffled through his papers. He first brought up the subject of Chinese prisoners of war and pledged that they would be released as soon as possible, which pleased the Chinese delegates. However, Hirota warned that in return he expected the Chinese to free the emperor. Chen Gongbo’s answer was disconcerting: he claimed that the emperor had escaped during the chaos of the battle and was liable to still be roaming around Guilin! This was startling news and Hirota asked if us generals would be able to immediately take a plane back to Guilin to begin the search while the official end to the negotiations would occur the next day. Chen Gongbo amiably agreed and soon afterward the conference was over and Yamashita, Okamura and I were simultaneously hastily packing what we had taken along to Chongqing, saying our good-byes to our fellow Japanese as well as to the Chinese delegates before boarding the plane back to Guilin.