Explorations in Strategy - Italy at War

womble: That does sound intriguing, yes...

Update coming up!

The Year of Upheaval
Part 12: Technology II, July – December, 1942

As is usually the case, war tends to spur technological development, particularly once the people aspect of Clausewitz’s secondary trinity become involved in it. Vast geopolitical and geostrategic issues are settled on a backdrop of technological advance, and never more so than during this war. While the second half of the year saw little in the way of significant change in geopolitical and geostrategic terms, notwithstanding the continued upheaval in Scandinavia, technological and doctrinal change ran full tilt as per its wont. Of course, trends in technological and doctrinal development are almost always evolutionary rather than revolutionary and thus bring only incremental improvement. There were no revolutions here.

July began with immediate improvements in Italian artillery design, as well as to infantry support weapons, both examples of hard technology whose advancement leads to directly improved results on the battlefield. These two projects were succeeded by soft technology, concerning steel production and oil refining. On the 9th of July, infantry anti-armor weaponry received a much needed improvement, given the superiority of Soviet tanks to anything the Italians had to defend with against them. This project was succeeded by beginning development on a medium bomb. Next, Italian industry reported their results on an initiative to make supply production more efficient, which was successful. This was followed by the commencement of a new naval staff study on radar training. The day later, Italian scientists made another breakthrough regarding radar, thus making possible more effective warship radars. Mussolini at this point ordered these scientists to turn their talents to improving Italy’s electronic computing machines. Finally, July ended with the publication of a general staff study on mass assaults. This was succeeded by dedicating more scientists to a mechanical computing machine, in the hope that somehow the effects of work on two different types of computing machines would cumulatively apply.


Yet another publication on mass assaults, an exercise which to an infantryman never sounds promising.

The first half of August was quiet on the technological front, but on the 15th things began changing as the naval staff put out a study on advanced naval bomber tactics. Mussolini immediately corralled a group of technicians and ordered them to develop an improved decryption machine. The 19th of August saw increased efficiency in Italian industry on the whole, resulting in less wastage. This project was succeeded by the continued development of an improved encryption machine. Mussolini took intelligence, particularly signals intelligence, seriously. After this came more naval air arm developments: a revised manual on port strike tactics on the 29th and similarly improved doctrine on naval strikes on September 5th. The former was succeeded by beginning development on amphibious warfare equipment, and the latter continued to study naval strikes further. On the 8th, the general staff released yet another study on guerrilla warfare, a project which was continued. The naval staff released a fourth study, on naval air targeting. Mussolini immediately ordered the development of a medium air search radar set for Italian bombers. Finally, on October 9th, the general staff published again another study, this one on special forces. It was succeeded by a general staff study on supply transportation.


Another general staff publication on special forces.

The last Italian technological developments could, on the whole, be nearly all labeled as soft technology. November 10th saw the development of coal processing technology and the succession of this project by a general staff study on supply organization. On the 22nd Italian industry reported successes in advances of steel production and rare material refining techniques. These two projects were replaced by a general staff study on civil defense and a small air search radar set for fighters. The 23rd saw the improvement of Italian coal to oil conversion processes and the replacement of this project by that of an improved twin engine airframe. The 25th of November saw the advance of Italian oil refining techniques, and the beginning of Italian rocket test development, making the most concentrated period of completed projects the latter half of November. On December 25th, the naval staff put out its new doctrine on radar training. This project was succeeded by an initiative dedicated to improving aero engines. Finally, the year ended with four advances coming all at once: electronic and mechanical computing machines, and encryption and decryption devices. These four projects were replaced by small warship anti-submarine warfare radar, medium fuel tank development, single engine aircraft airframe development and small fuel tank development.


And thus the year ended.

As intimated already, none of the improvements in technology were revolutionary nor had any real potential to be. Thus technology would be no solution to Italy’s increasingly difficult strategic position, notwithstanding some sort of miraculous breakthrough in very high-explosive devices, a line of technological development Italy had not even considered going down. It would, as usual, be down to the human factors of war and strategy that would have to make the difference in the end.

Forster: No real change since last time we looked at it. Change comes only slowly in Africa.

Jemisi: Dunno, not played next year yet. But it's not surprising that tech won't really change much.

So, in a couple hours my long journey home begins!

Enewald: 15 or 16 or 17 on research (don't remember exactly) and then maybe 1 on officers.

Forster: Depends on how I'm feeling. At the moment it's Princeton, New Jersey.

womble: I didn't know that. That's a shame.

Forster: Yes, it would be.

womble: Has it always been like this, or was it introduced only in 1.3, do you know?

So, I'm now at home. It's 6:33 in the morning for me and I just woke up after going to bed at about 8:30 last night. No update today as I'll be jetlagged to hell and going to a talk by Barry Pavel in the evening. Update maybe tomorrow evening.

womble: Well, that's quite unfortunate.

Zechariah: Thanks, and welcome!

Jemisi: Damn, confirmation!

Right, so I'll try to have an update for tonight guys!

The Year of Upheaval
Part 13: Conclusion

1942 had been a year of upheaval, and even as late as the beginning of January of the following year it remained to be seen how Mussolini would act to deal with the strategic challenges facing Italy and the Axis alliance generally. In understanding the options open to Mussolini it would be conducive to review not only the geostrategic situation, as usual for the end of a year, but also the shape of all branches of the Italian military machine.

By the end of 1942, the Regio Esercito fielded a total of 151 brigades, in sum up a total of six brigades from the advent of 1936. The Regia Aeronautica had seemingly doubled in size, or at least the number of Italian aircraft certainly had. The Regia Marina had increased from a total of 59 ships to 71, an increase of only 12. The demand for supplies and fuel had increased by a third and between a third and a half, respectively. Italian industry was having to devote greater resources merely to sustaining the Italian armed forces, but Italian industry by this time also counted amongst its strengths the indigenous industries of Iberia, albeit not any more those of the Balkans and Anatolia. Broadly-speaking, Italy had grown stronger, notwithstanding the Russian bear on its doorstep.


Pies of a general nature.

It is now time to turn to examine the Regio Esercito more closely. It had increased by only six brigades in total from 1936, but this is of course not the entire story. In 1936 the Italian army fielded twenty-nine brigades of militia and thirty-three headquarters; in 1942 these militia formations had been long disbanded and despite the expansion of the Regio Esercito, the number of headquarters remained lower than in 1936, at twenty-six. Indeed, at the end of 1942 six marine brigades existed, and the infantry branch of the army had increased from sixty-three brigades to ninety-nine. This marked a very real improvement in the quality of the Regio Esercito from the beginning of Mussolini’s strategic renaissance in 1936. This expanded and improved Regio Esercito was divided into four basic theaters. The smallest was that of Central and East Africa, where two headquarters commanded six infantry and six marine brigades, respectively, totaling forty-two thousand men. In Spain, three headquarters controlled twelve infantry and two mountaineer brigades, totaling forty-five thousand men. The next in size was North Africa and Palestine, where three headquarters commanded six infantry, six cavalry, three motorized infantry and one armored car brigades totaling fifty-five thousand men. The largest and most demanding theater was Illyria, naturally, where fourteen headquarters controlled eight mountaineer and seventy-four infantry brigades, totaling two hundred and eighty-eight thousand men.


Pies which the Regio Esercito has its fingers in.

The Regia Aeronautica had, in actuality, very little growth during the years leading up to 1943. In fact, it had none. Its OOB remains as it was in 1936, with five interceptor, three naval bomber, three medium bomber and one transport squadron. All the growth of air power in Italy went to the naval air arm: the carrier air groups. Of these, a total of twelve had been created by the end of 1942 and represented fully half of the entire air power of the country. The Regia Aeronautica remained the most neglected service in the Italian armed forces, and this seemed unlikely to change in the future.


The Regia Aeronautica’s small pies.

In 1936, the Regia Marine had stood at four battleships, eighteen destroyers, eight heavy and twelve light cruisers, eleven submarine and six transport flotillas. By the end of 1942 its OOB had been powerfully reinforced. Five fleet and two escort carriers had joined its surface fleets, as had thirteen light cruisers. Italy had over the intervening years actually lost one transport flotilla, however, as well as two submarine flotillas, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers. Nevertheless, it remained by far the most potent of all of Italy’s armed services, as evidenced by the destruction of the South African fleet in port by Da Zara’s aviators. The Regia Marina could be expected to accomplish with pomp and precision any task that was asked of it. Any task, that is, except the actual destruction of what amounted to possibly all of the Royal Navy’s heavy units in the port of Tel Aviv. That task was beyond the capabilities of the gods, let alone men.


The Regia Marina’s powerful pies.

In geostrategic terms, the situation was not overly favorable to Italy. Its forward defense in Africa was doing a good job of keeping the British away from Egypt, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. Spain was secure, though constantly under threat from Allied landings from bases in the near abroad, such as the Canary Islands and the British Isles. While this threat had only actually been manifested once, it was likely that the British would at some point try again. The main threat, of course, was in Illyria. There, the Soviet armies sat virtually at the doorstep into Italy proper. Furthermore, if the Italian line broke there, then the deep German rear, Austria, would be compromised and the Soviets would likely range wide and far into Germany itself. Given the strategic mettle of Germany’s leaders, they would undoubtedly panic even worse than during the peripheral Scandinavian crisis and Germany would collapse like a house of cards.


The worldly parts that are of interest.

There were a handful of important questions Mussolini faced at this junction in history. Firstly, what did he have to do? This question was simple, in fact, to answer: he had to stop the Soviets. Mussolini’s preferences notwithstanding, the Soviets were clearly the greatest threat Italy had faced since the Gauls, who periodically sacked Rome before it became powerful enough to conquer them in turn. But, like Clausewitz had written over a century previously, everything in war was simple, but that does not mean that everything was easy. What could Mussolini do stop the Soviets? This was a much more difficult question to answer; it firmly depended upon relative capabilities. Whatever Mussolini would do, he would likely need to increase the Regio Esercito’s capabilities even further. And now came one of the vital questions every strategist had to answer: how much was enough? No strategist could or can ever answer such a question with certainty save in retrospect and even then only sometimes, and by that time the issue has already been decided, and sometimes by decades. Thus, the question hung like Damocles’ sword above Mussolini’s head. How much was enough to create the strategic effect he desired?