Operation Brise
The German plan of war had called for our positions in East Prussia to hold along our fortress line, and to wait for the Soviets to pass along the southern border of East Prussia as they were advancing along the path of least resistance. Surely, we believed, this would eventually put the Soviets in a position where they would be vulnerable to a foray by German armor/mobile forces being screened by the forts.
Originally, this offensive arm was centered around Gen. Guderian’s light tank division (which is 2/3 light tank, 1/3 motorized infantry), but as new divisions came on line they were rushed in from the west in hopes of bolstering this offensive capability. It was decided that the time was ripe to mount a counterattack – an attempt to cut off and destroy a small number of Soviet divisions, or at the very least serve as a test of arms which could allow us to speculate as to how this war would go, given the relative strengths of forces.
As such, Gen. Rommel made his way south into Poland in order to form the right pincer while Gen. von Manstein launched his left, northern pincer attack against Grajewo on the 28th of July. The Russians, by this time, were tired. Many of them had not fully reached their mobilization targets yet, and the dogged, if seemingly hopeless, defense of the Polish Army had worn them down. This made for some soft spots in the enemy lines, and by the 2nd day of the offensive, Manstein’s troops had pushed through, with von Funck’s 10th Panzer hot on his heels.
But soon, Manstein’s spearhead was hit from the flank by infantry from the Suwalki area. The 10th Panzer pivoted, and hit them hard on their own flank. There hadn’t been an intent to expand the offensive to Suwalki (it would have been wise to pin these divisions first, but there were limited forces at the Germans’ disposal).
Over the next couple of days, the Soviet divisions from Suwalki broke off their attack on Manstein, but it was picked up again by other Russian units further south. The pressure upon Manstein’s light Panzers was kept up, and his progress was minimal.
At that time, on the 1st, Gen. Rommel’s motorized infantry hit the enemy at Sukolow, punching the second pincer in painfully. Despite the lack of progress further north, it was expected that Rommel’s drive would be sufficient to cut off the Soviet divisions which had been pressing into East Prussia.
German air power was evident throughout this period, with Stuka squadrons hitting the points of attack relentlessly. The Red Air Force had been flooding the skies with fighters, in the early days of war, but there had been virtually nothing seen of the enemy bombers. They did, during this week, begin hitting targets in Grajewo and Seidice with medium bombers. Now, the German fighters – light and heavy fighters based out of Marienburg, which had recently been expanded – hit the Soviet fighters, and it was apparent they were taking a toll in both numbers of planes and operability. There was some hope, early on, that the Red Air Force might crumble at the feet of a more capable, if numerically inferior, Luftwaffe.
The 10th Panzer backed out of its offensive against Suwalki, and very quickly was replaced by the infantry which had been guarding Lyck. It was decided that, despite the fact that those infantry were meant to dig in and protect Lyck on a permanent basis, the situation demanded their employment to free up the Panzers, which would be wasted on a mere pinning operation.
So the 10th Panzer rushed south to support von Manstein. There was concern that the offensive was already stalling, and that could not be allowed. Sadly, though, by the time the 10th arrived, von Manstein’s panzers were already falling back in an orderly retreat, completely spent. The Panzer III design was just not made for staying power on defense – it was a light, hit & run craft, and once the initiative was lost was hard to get it back.
Von Funck’s Panzer IVs, by contrast, did have staying power. But that was not their role either – a defensive slugging match. Their role, truth be told, was meant to be entirely offensive. They would be wasted in a defensive role, losing the ability to react to a changing situation and move into whatever situations presented themselves. So von Funck fell back, too.
In the south, on the 3rd, Rommel had succeeded in pushing the enemy back. At this point, however, the initial point of the counterattack had already failed. Nevertheless, there were at least 3 Soviet divisions virtually trapped, to the north, and Rommel was in a position to capitalize upon that.
Rather than try to complete the planned encirclement, on the 5th of August he turned the frontage of his attack north, pushing toward Lomza. If he could harry the Soviets north, then there would still be an encirclement, just not as great a one as the original plan called for. However, the Russians hit his flank from behind, complicating his mission.
As the Soviets moved forward to retake Grajewo, they were hit by a fresh attack by the 10th Panzer, meaning to throw them back yet again, and complete the planned encirclement. Moreover, Keppler’s 4th Panzer had just arrived from Germany, and employed itself in a flanking attack upon Lomza. But Rommel was quickly losing the ability to fight in two directions at once, and his ability to press home the attack was reduced by the hour.
There were just so many Soviet divisions pushing forward, into Poland, that the Germans were at risk of being rolled under. Soon enough, there were more, fresh units defending at Grajewo. Each German option seemed to be undercut just as it seemed on the verge of success. Urgent consultation was undertaken at the General Staff on the wisdom of continuing these operations.
Late on the morning of the 5th, orders went out to all units to cease Operation Brise and break contact with the enemy.
Each division would fall back, either behind the cover of German infantry in East Prussia, or Polish infantry in Poland itself. They would collect again in East Prussia, regroup, and reassess.
By the 8th, Rommel had successfully broken contact. Brise had been a failure. The German military, despite significant preparations and a decent amount of hardware, had proven it was not yet strong enough to stand with equality against the Soviet army.
Its offensive punching power was still not developed well enough to accomplish the mission with which it was tasked. The handicaps of Versailles, and the delicate diplomatic situation with the Allies, were still haunting Germany.
Nevertheless, nothing had really been lost in the venture. Experience had been gained, both general and specific, and these lessons would inform future employments of the offensive units.
Unfortunately, it was too late for these lessons to help the German southern counterattack, already underway.
Next: Operation Griff, in the south of Poland
